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All my Latin American students and not a few radical friends strongly claim that what
took place in Bolivia was a coup, focusing on the military role. I hesitate to concede
the point, to begin with because the previous extra-constitutional manipulation by
President Evo Morales, concerning the most important legal issue under presidential
governments, that of term limits, very much prepared his own down-fall.
That choice in the face of the clear text of the Constitution he and his party helped
to craft, in the face of a lost popular referendum, relied on a very dubious decision
of the Supreme Tribunal of Justice previously established and packed by Morales
himself. It should not be any more excused in the case of Morales than partially
similar efforts of other Latin American presidents: Peron, Uribe, Fujimori, Menem,
Chavez and Maduro. All of them sought to achieve third and fourth terms, implying
the populist-personalist deformation of presidential government. Several also packed
apex courts to enable their staying in power. Even the court packing scheme of
Franklin Roosevelt, along with his running for four (!) terms should be strongly
criticized. The 22nd Amendment supported by huge Article V. majorities in the U.S.
Congress as well as the states was the culmination of that legitimate and much
needed critique.
Nevertheless, the prehistory does not change the fact that there could have been
a coup that removed President Morales. For example it was indeed a coup that
removed Peron during his second term in office and after many of his own abuses
of constitutional government.  Thus, before deciding the question in the Bolivian
case, we need to try to understand what a coup is, and how it is different from a
revolution. Interestingly, the older positivist legal theory defining revolution as the
replacement of a government according to a process outside the legal rules of
change was not able to make the distinction. We can improve on such a definition
by replacing government by regime, and stressing regime change as well as the
rupture of political legitimacy in the case of revolutions, but not necessarily coups
that could be reduced to mere governmental replacement. But even then, Pinochet’s
coup in Chile would still amount to a revolution. Most Leftists would undoubtedly
answer that claim by adding the idea of progress, based on their value scheme, as
a necessary component of revolutions. Analytically however that move cannot be
justified, even by the use of the term counter-revolution. As we in Hungary after 1956
were chagrined to learn, what was to us a revolution was a counter-revolution to the
Communist faithful. 
Even worse, almost all successful revolutions involve the violent taking of power
by an armed elite, on behalf of a minority, the Bolshevik revolution being a case
in point. There was also a coup by the new model army in the Puritan Revolution,
- 1 -
and a Jacobin coup against a freely elected Convention in the French.  Thus if my
political side continues to insist on a coup in Bolivia, we may have to accept that the
other side will see the same as a revolution. After all not only legality was broken,
but political legitimacy was shattered by Morales himself. There were furthermore
huge anti-government masses assembled on the streets of many cities, and the
duplication of sovereignty insisted on by no less a revolutionary than Leon Trotsky
was realized at the latest when the police forces joined the demonstrations. Given
the social stakes involved however, a right-wing revolution would be a disaster in
Bolivia.
I continue to hope however that what occurred was not a revolution, and the brief
events described as a coup represented only the unwillingness of the military to
fight for a government that has lost its legitimacy. The hope can be disappointed, if
the right wing supposedly interim government seeks to perpetuate itself, and either
blocks the road to genuinely free elections, or deforms that process by repression,
media manipulation or the ban on candidacies. If any of this happens, the dictatorial
propensity of revolutions as well as coups would have been be realized.
But fortunately there is another method of radical change, namely negotiated
transition, that has been practiced from Spain in the 1970s, Poland and Hungary in
the late 1980s, and South Africa in the 1990s. (On this method see the forthcoming
symposium on the Round Tables in Verfassungsblog edited by Kriszta Kovács).
As Tunisia has shown, even after break in legality and legitimacy the negotiated
model can be successfully followed, in effect domesticating the logic of revolution.
There are signs that in Bolivia too, the new scenario of change can be followed after
a crisis of legitimacy and an ambiguous break in legality. The fact that after initial
boycotts of the legislature, the party of the ex-president, the MAS (Movement for
Socialism) has agreed to and voted for an electoral scenario, without Morales as
a candidate, indicates the positive direction the situation can evolve. But only the
direction. Under the repressive measures of the military controlled by the interim
government no free elections would be possible. The same is true if the social
movements loyal more to Morales personally than to the MAS continue to put
several cities under what amounts to a siege.  
A negotiated transition is not a matter of a single agreement, but a process of many
steps by which mutual trust initially broken can be re-established. This means not
only that politicians inside and outside Bolivia should desist from inflammatory
statements, including references to a coup or to a revolution, but also the threat
to arrest and imprison former leaders as customary in revolutions. Under the
circumstances, the need for international supervision of legality, fair elections and
openness of the media will be mandatory. The political outcome is far from clear, but
it should be the joint product of the main sections of Bolivian society, rather than an
imposition of any section, ethnic or political. Paradoxically, it may take international
influence if not intervention to restore the democratic constituent power of Bolivians.
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